Gay Marriage Can’t Possibly Work

It's the kids (or lack thereof)

The institution of marriage is in possession of a few natural, fundamental tendencies: procreation and the education of children, and friendship. They are natural insofar as they are organized and intelligible in that domain. At present, I am strictly concerned with the procreative tendency of marriage. Through such considerations, the incoherence of supposed gay marriage will be explained.

The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole of life, is by its nature ordered toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring; this covenant between baptized persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament.

— CCC 1601¹

I begin with a definition provided by the church, as it is succinct and accurate. It should be obvious to all that an articulation of a notion drawn from the church should not be per se disqualified, including from those of non-religious, anti-Christian backgrounds. We don’t reject the modern calendar because it was fixed by the church, nor do we continue to use it on that basis alone. Rather, because it properly organizes the year, there is merit in the creation, absent its origins. So too might we find use in this definition of marriage. Moreover, marriage might (ideally should I’d ultimately argue) be understood theologically, but this would be to enter a realm beyond its basic ontological reality. The supernatural claims—including the sacramentalness of marriage—need not be defended for the natural claims to be true; they are extensions of what is present in nature. One is welcome to reject any elements explicitly and entirely Christian (e.g., “baptized”) but might not under the same force reject the claims about ordinary natural notions (e.g., “by its nature ordered toward the good”). One can say “I am not a Christian,” and this is an acceptable enough justification not to care about the category of baptized persons, but that response does not confer the same sort of reasonable rejection of what is argued to be good. Instead, he might say “I don’t believe the good exists” or “the good is not ordered in that way”, and will adopt a philosophical attitude that requires defense beyond a simple denial of the Christian faith. On another related matter, the language of covenant appears often in Christianity and is thus rightfully associated with it, but is also not solely understood theologically; it might also be understood as merely suggesting a binding agreement, which is of importance for our purposes here. All of this is simply to say that the definition of marriage ought to be considered in a way fitting for each of its aspects—we must evaluate the embedded ideas fairly.

Defining gay marriage is difficult. Many will argue that gay marriage is the same as normal marriage, but gay. In other words, it is what we understand a marriage to be ordinarily, but now entails the potential of those involved to be of the same sex. This will be satisfactory for many, especially those who have not considered the topic deeply, but it’s ultimately incoherent. Essential to marriage is the natural tendency of procreation, and two people of the same sex cannot be said to have a joint procreative tendency. Not only is procreation not possible in gay relations, but their relation will not be rooted in the generation of children because such an outcome is not what flows from their natural orientation, including but not limited to, the basic function of their sexual organs; said outcome will only ever be frustrated by gay sexual relations, never realized.

Others might define it by pointing out different marriages they have observed. “Look at Chris and Mary”, or “look at Tom and Jerry—those relations, that sort of thing, is what is meant by a marriage,” one might argue. Certainly a valiant effort, one that I am not an absolute enemy of. This is generally how people come to understand and even develop basic understandings of social institutions. Nonetheless, this does not sufficiently define the institution itself. It is one thing to have an intuitive understanding of a notion, but another to articulate it. We can’t jump into a person’s mind and experience everything that has led to an understanding, including both historical circumstances and their active state. Rather, we must rely on a definition that organizes the principles in a concrete, universal way. It’s a notion that transcends mere instances, while binding them all together. No amount of situations can replace the necessity of definitions, of which this approach does not provide.

It may be said that while gay marriage is hard to pin down precisely, the traditional marriage position carries serious internal issues. Some will say that not every person who enters into a marriage will have kids. Infertility is the most fitting example to bring up. Even a man and woman attempting to have children naturally, under these conditions, will fail to do so. We then have an increasingly common contingent of people who are heterosexual, who would qualify for marriage under this definition, and yet would not procreate. Thus, as it may be argued, it would seem unnecessarily cruel to deny gay couples marriage, as the marriages of infertile couples would be perceived as legitimate.

To adequately address the stated objection, we must lay some further groundwork. Definitions are principled encapsulations of essential realities. The essence of a thing is its most fundamental whatness. It is a real, transcending reality of any of its instantiations. For example, when we speak of a man, that entails essentially an embodied rational soul. We might talk about men having two arms and two hands, which is proper to a man, but we would say it is not essential for a man to have those for him to still be a man. It is indeed possible for a man to have no arms, or one arm and no legs, or two legs and one arm—yet all of these are still men.

When we say marriage is between a man and a woman, we are bound to the essential reality of both, including their intrinsic tendency towards procreation, which is not the same as the realization of procreation (the conception of a child), but is as real as such. If a particular man or woman (or both) is infertile in a relationship, this does not change the reality that sexual intimacy between men and women is both possible in principle and encouraged inasmuch as their natural beings possess a directiveness toward that outcome. Fertility issues, born of individual defects, do not change the existence of the tendency—it’s a matter of the essence of the being. Consider the tendency as the driving force behind both the manifestation of this essential being we call the person and that which explains certain ways the being is realized. For example, we don’t say every man has two arms; as mentioned above, this is not always true. More accurately, we’d say men tend to have two arms, with full recognition that this accords the proper actualization of features of men. And the body will develop in a way conducive to that end unless something frustrates it—here, likely some biological issue that is inimical to the development and growth of arms.

Now, the second objection basically boils down to “well, who cares and why does it matter to you?” The obvious is to state: one with this attitude, or anything similar, “cares” about the matter, as they are affording it time and energy. Putting that aside, we ought to introduce the importance of definitions. After all, marriage might very well be something ingrained into nature, and in essence what I have articulated, but why must we define it as such?—why should its ontological merits direct us in this way?

The easiest and most intuitive response is that humans are inclined toward the truth, and truth is rooted in nature. It is a matter of what objects—including marriage as an institution, you as a person, the machine you are reading off of, the tree in your front yard—are. In some sense, all these are definable because they entail some concrete reality that organizes their existence. The goal of the truth-seeker is to relate that reality with its proper definition, with full awareness of what definitions do and under what circumstances they exist. The terms we use are associated with traditions that often form over long periods of time and thus carry their own baggage; the individuality of bodies of people drives unique variations in terminology. But even so, the terms, if accurate, will refer to the same fundamental nature or essence. And so it matters on account that the truth is important and we ought to represent it accurately with our definitions.

However, more should be said about the political implications of this. Definitions have a direct impact on society’s existence because they shape people’s minds and influence how they experience their liberty. Define marriage in a way that allows for no-fault divorce, and people will be more inclined to a transactional view of marriage, not a life-long, indissoluble commitment. Allow people of the same sex to enter into a marital “union”, which does not naturally tend toward children, and people will not sense the fundamental role procreation has in marriage—they will be ignorant of the fact that marriage is about the kids. Such is detrimental to society and the individual alike, and therefore, matters.

Our discussion began with a definition of marriage, with a thread devoted to a few relevant domains (let’s say, natural philosophy versus divine revelation). The hope was not only to scaffold a conversation restricted to the natural domain, but to address the anti-religious impulse that might obscure the view of potentially reasonable argumentation to follow. Next, there was a focus on how people go about defining gay marriage. These were demonstrated to be incoherent due to their procreative deficiency. Finally, a few objections to the traditional understanding were addressed. Throughout the latter two sections, the focus was on procreation—the presence of it in marriage and the absence of it in gay marriage.

Much of what has been said here deserves further elaboration, which is incumbent upon me to pursue in the future. You may also expect a variety of other arguments against supposed gay marriage, including preserving the dignity of the children themselves (not just the generative tendency that encourages their creation) and the general complementarity of the sexes, among others. Atlas, we have reached the end of our start. Now, hit the subscribe so you don’t miss out, and share this with a friend so they can come along for the ride.

1. Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. (West Chester, PA: Ascension Press, 2022), no. 1601.