The institution of marriage is in possession of a few natural, fundamental tendencies: procreation and the education of children, and friendship. They are natural insofar as they are organized and intelligible in that domain. At present, I am strictly concerned with the procreative tendency of marriage. Through such considerations, the incoherence of supposed gay marriage will be explained.

The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole of life, is by its nature ordered toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring; this covenant between baptized persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament.

— CCC 16011

I begin with a definition provided by the church, as it is succinct and accurate. It should be obvious to all that an articulation of a notion drawn from the church should not be per se disqualified, including from those of non-religious, anti-Christian backgrounds. We don’t reject the modern calendar because it was fixed by the church, nor do we continue to use it on that basis alone. Rather, because it properly organizes the year, there is merit in the creation, absent its origins. So too might we find use in this definition of marriage. Moreover, marriage might (ideally should I’d ultimately argue) be understood theologically, but this would be to enter a realm beyond its basic ontological reality. The supernatural claims—including the sacramentalness of marriage—need not be defended for the natural claims to be true; they are extensions of what is present in nature. One is welcome to reject any elements explicitly and entirely Christian (e.g., “baptized”) but might not under the same force reject the claims about ordinary natural notions (e.g., “by its nature ordered toward the good”). One can say “I am not a Christian,” and this is an acceptable enough justification not to care about the category of baptized persons, but that response does not confer the same sort of reasonable rejection of what is argued to be good. Instead, he might say “I don’t believe the good exists” or “the good is not ordered in that way”, and will adopt a philosophical attitude that requires defense beyond a simple denial of the Christian faith. On another related matter, the language of covenant appears often in Christianity and is thus rightfully associated with it, but is also not solely understood theologically; it might also be understood as merely suggesting a binding agreement, which is of importance for our purposes here. All of this is simply to say that the definition of marriage ought to be considered in a way fitting for each of its aspects—we must evaluate the embedded ideas fairly.

Defining gay marriage is difficult. Many will argue that gay marriage is the same as normal marriage, but gay. In other words, it is what we understand a marriage to be ordinarily, but now entails the potential of those involved to be of the same sex. This will be satisfactory for many, especially those who have not considered the topic deeply, but it’s ultimately incoherent. Essential to marriage is the natural tendency of procreation, and two people of the same sex cannot be said to have a joint procreative tendency. Not only is procreation not possible in gay relations, but their relation will not be rooted in the generation of children because such an outcome is not what flows from their natural orientation, including but not limited to, the basic function of their sexual organs; said outcome will only ever be frustrated by gay sexual relations, never realized.

Others might define it by pointing out different marriages they have observed. “Look at Chris and Mary”, or “look at Tom and Jerry—those relations, that sort of thing, is what is meant by a marriage,” one might argue. Certainly a valiant effort, one that I am not an absolute enemy of. This is generally how people come to understand and even develop basic understandings of social institutions. Nonetheless, this does not sufficiently define the institution itself. It is one thing to have an intuitive understanding of a notion, but another to articulate it. We can’t jump into a person’s mind and experience everything that has led to an understanding, including both historical circumstances and their active state. Rather, we must rely on a definition that organizes the principles in a concrete, universal way. It’s a notion that transcends mere instances, while binding them all together. No amount of situations can replace the necessity of definitions, of which this approach does not provide.

It may be said that while gay marriage is hard to pin down precisely, the traditional marriage position carries serious internal issues. Some will say that not every person who enters into a marriage will have kids. Infertility is the most fitting example to bring up. Even a man and woman attempting to have children naturally, under these conditions, will fail to do so. We then have an increasingly common contingent of people who are heterosexual, who would qualify for marriage under this definition, and yet would not procreate. Thus, as it may be argued, it would seem unnecessarily cruel to deny gay couples marriage, as the marriages of infertile couples would be perceived as legitimate.

To adequately address the stated objection, we must lay some further groundwork. Definitions are principled encapsulations of essential realities. The essence of a thing is its most fundamental whatness. It is a real, transcending reality of any of its instantiations. For example, when we speak of a man, that entails essentially an embodied rational soul. We might talk about men having two arms and two hands, which is proper to a man, but we would say it is not essential for a man to have those for him to still be a man. It is indeed possible for a man to have no arms, or one arm and no legs, or two legs and one arm—yet all of these are still men.

When we say marriage is between a man and a woman, we are bound to the essential reality of both, including their intrinsic tendency towards procreation, which is not the same as the realization of procreation (the conception of a child), but is as real as such. If a particular man or woman (or both) is infertile in a relationship, this does not change the reality that sexual intimacy between men and women is both possible in principle and encouraged inasmuch as their natural beings possess a directiveness toward that outcome. Fertility issues, born of individual defects, do not change the existence of the tendency—it’s a matter of the essence of the being. Consider the tendency as the driving force behind both the manifestation of this essential being we call the person and that which explains certain ways the being is realized. For example, we don’t say every man has two arms; as mentioned above, this is not always true. More accurately, we’d say men tend to have two arms, with full recognition that this accords the proper actualization of features of men. And the body will develop in a way conducive to that end unless something frustrates it—here, likely some biological issue that is inimical to the development and growth of arms.

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Now, the second objection basically boils down to “well, who cares and why does it matter to you?” The obvious is to state: one with this attitude, or anything similar, “cares” about the matter, as they are affording it time and energy. Putting that aside, we ought to introduce the importance of definitions. After all, marriage might very well be something ingrained into nature, and in essence what I have articulated, but why must we define it as such?—why should its ontological merits direct us in this way?

The easiest and most intuitive response is that humans are inclined toward the truth, and truth is rooted in nature. It is a matter of what objects—including marriage as an institution, you as a person, the machine you are reading off of, the tree in your front yard—are. In some sense, all these are definable because they entail some concrete reality that organizes their existence. The goal of the truth-seeker is to relate that reality with its proper definition, with full awareness of what definitions do and under what circumstances they exist. The terms we use are associated with traditions that often form over long periods of time and thus carry their own baggage; the individuality of bodies of people drives unique variations in terminology. But even so, the terms, if accurate, will refer to the same fundamental nature or essence. And so it matters on account that the truth is important and we ought to represent it accurately with our definitions.

However, more should be said about the political implications of this. Definitions have a direct impact on society’s existence because they shape people’s minds and influence how they experience their liberty. Define marriage in a way that allows for no-fault divorce, and people will be more inclined to a transactional view of marriage, not a life-long, indissoluble commitment. Allow people of the same sex to enter into a marital “union”, which does not naturally tend toward children, and people will not sense the fundamental role procreation has in marriage—they will be ignorant of the fact that marriage is about the kids. Such is detrimental to society and the individual alike, and therefore, matters.

Our discussion began with a definition of marriage, with a thread devoted to a few relevant domains (let’s say, natural philosophy versus divine revelation). The hope was not only to scaffold a conversation restricted to the natural domain, but to address the anti-religious impulse that might obscure the view of potentially reasonable argumentation to follow. Next, there was a focus on how people go about defining gay marriage. These were demonstrated to be incoherent due to their procreative deficiency. Finally, a few objections to the traditional understanding were addressed. Throughout the latter two sections, the focus was on procreation—the presence of it in marriage and the absence of it in gay marriage.

Much of what has been said here deserves further elaboration, which is incumbent upon me to pursue in the future. You may also expect a variety of other arguments against supposed gay marriage, including preserving the dignity of the children themselves (not just the generative tendency that encourages their creation) and the general complementarity of the sexes, among others. Atlas, we have reached the end of our start. Now, hit the subscribe so you don’t miss out, and share this with a friend so they can come along for the ride.

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ICE has ramped up its operation to remove illegal immigrants from the country, and by consequence, social media is constantly bombarded by both clips of their arrests and of those looking to disrupt their work. Evidently, the divide on this issue is severe. While the opposition clearly disagrees with the way in which ICE is carrying out its mission, I find it spirited by a more general idea: immigration cannot possibly be harmful. Thus, ICE’s position is interpreted as intrinsically flawed. This follows from the erroneous, but incredibly common, political notion that immigration is an intrinsic good, something per se conducive to the flourishing of the country. However, that is ludicrous and ignores the most basic of political realities. Immigrants may threaten the well-being of a community, just as they might encourage its prosperity, depending on what the circumstances entail—and most importantly, who is involved.

Given how controversial the immigration issue has become, I want to clarify a few relevant points to hopefully address the inevitable misinterpretations. My discussion is certainly inspired by the American situation, but focused on principles that transcend specific polities and their associated legal apparatuses. Nonetheless, the sentiments to be explored will be of great use when examining the merits of immigration goals set forth by the United States or any other country, for that matter. Next, in the same sense that immigration is not a per se good, it is not a per se wrong, and I will not be arguing such through my immigration analysis. Finally, our world has always been marked by the shifting of people; this is a fact of nature that deserves our serious attention. Unavoidably, when genuinely considering the matter specifically in the United States, one will find that a great number of immigrants have advanced the perfection of this country. This is all to say that immigration flows from natural geopolitical realities and can be very good for society.

It is helpful first to begin with the most obvious example of the sort of immigrants the country does not need: criminals. I am not simply referring to those who have committed minor offenses (although these alone can be problematic for potential immigrants), but severely disordered crimes, including but not limited to murder, terrorism, child sex offenses, and drug trafficking—all morally horrific actions that indicate one is severely depraved. These are not irredeemable people, but as a general rule, should not be trusted and accepted with open arms as immigrants, lest we intend to directly harm the communities they are becoming a part of. Immediately, under these conditions, the notion that immigration is a per se good is dismantled—these sorts of immigrants would pose a legitimate threat to the communities they enter. I will labor little on this point, as I find it easily affirmable and non-controversial.

However, there is more to the immigration issue than simply the worst of people attempting to enter a country. Before we concern ourselves further with this matter, we must first address some of the fundamentals at play in this situation, what we might call the political metaphysics. Man, by nature, is a political animal. He is understood as part of a whole (the political community); when in community, as he tends to be, his nature (what he is) most fully manifests (perfects). This is an inextricably two-sided relationship; the community will influence and dictate aspects of him, and he will play a role in shaping the community. If the community is healthy, then he will be of benefit, but if it suffers an illness, he will reap those effects as well.

Political Society, required by nature and achieved by reason, is the most perfect of temporal societies. It is a concretely and wholly human reality, tending to a concretely and wholly human good—the common good.

[...]

The entire man— though not by reason of his entire self and of all that he is and has— is part of the political society; and thus all his community activities, as well as his personal activities, are of consequence to the political whole.

— Jacques Maritain, Man and the State1

Furthermore, the political community is not first and foremost the written law but the unified body of people. The community has a moral character, built upon the people that form it. The good man upholds and promotes virtue; he plays a pivotal role in what makes the community healthy. Conversely, the bad man is an animated threat to the community’s well-being. To make this notion clearer, consider a matter as trivial as theft. For a society to have a theft problem, there must be a contingent of people actively stealing, and for people to steal, they must be weak in virtue, most specifically justice. If no one steals, then one couldn’t possibly diagnose society with a theft problem—these matters rest on the state of the people who make up the community. This specific example, as well as all matters of virtue in communities, is ontologically dependent, insofar as the embodied souls and their present state of being are of the utmost concern. In the same way the community might be strengthened by men of good character, it suffers from those of deficient character. The character of the body politic (essentially, the political community) is in no way impervious. If you release groups of people into a population who are not inclined toward justice, nevertheless virtue in general, you will have a body politic strongly defined by the ways in which it is not just or virtuous. As a consequence, we are now considering a transfer of people that negatively impacts the health of society. Immigration, then, can be a real danger, depending on who the people are and the current state of their character.

Up until this point, I have focused on what we might call critical moral considerations of the community; such aspects not only form the basic idea of the political community, but also heavily dictate the ways in which the society is presently well. But there are other ways in which societies exist that are not critical to the moral character of the community, but nonetheless important for the community at large. Bodies of people possess their own history, traditions, language, norms, standards, and other cultural attributes. They vary enormously depending on the people one is examining. Surely, particular cultures may be better at encouraging the moral life than others, but the flourishing of society is not reliant on the presence of these features in the same sense it relies on virtue, which is imperative to a healthy society. Nonetheless, they are defining characteristics of how the body of people manifests and should not be taken for granted.

Moreover, when the communal good is willed, it is done through people with their own culture. Two societies can promote the same virtue but through different means, which are fitting for the political sensibilities of those specific people. This is apparent in the variations among healthy governments and their related processes. For example, Western countries typically share a strong standard of justice, yet exhibit clear distinctions in how those standards manifest. Although they may appear differently, the virtues enable flourishing under differing cultural circumstances.

When individuals, with a note of permanence, engage in united action for a common purpose, there comes into existence a unity that transcends the aggregation of its parts. That is to say, there comes into existence a group-person (a society) that requires the rest of us to recognize not only the individuals, but, as Maitland puts it, “n + 1 persons.” It would “denature” the facts, Maitland says, to pretend otherwise. Every society will depend upon individual persons. This is just what Aristotle and Thomas meant by a unity of order, inasmuch as the members are not reducible to the whole as accidents to an underlying substance. Groups are not ontologically basic in the order of substances. They are basic, however, in constituting a unity that excels parts (members), which are also wholes (natural persons).

What Maitland calls “n + 1” persons means that the group or society, and not just its individual members, should morally count as an agent or a patient. As the bearer of rights and responsibilities, a society can harm or be harmed in the moral sense of the term. We morally harm a society when we fail to recognize its common good and its agency as an “n + 1” person by refusing to give it the proper legal personality or mask. In such cases, we do something more than harm what belongs privately to the individuals; more precisely, we harm what those individuals, as members, hold in common.

— Russell Hittinger, On the Dignity of Society2

The body politic’s continued existence depends upon its continued unity—without it, the people are merely an aggregation of individuals. This is certainly not a sort of absolute unity some may be inclined to, where individuality disappears; such would be just as damaging to the body politic as the loss of unity, ultimately lending itself to totalitarianism, but nevertheless existing in an unhealthy state. Rather, it is more akin to the human body, where each part exists in relation to the whole, while still maintaining its individuality as a part (e.g., the hand). In the same way the human body exists as a distinct whole due to the unity between its parts, so too does the body politic. The sharing of the mentioned strictly moral dimensions and secondary cultural dimensions largely determines the fundamental unity of the political community. However, individuals do not necessarily possess an active unity with any sort of body politic; people exist and are shaped by differing circumstances, leading to incompatibilities that vary in severity. Inasmuch as they do depends on precisely who the immigrants are—some will be more compatible, at the moment of their entry, with a society than others; a proportionate effect on the body politic’s unity is to be expected. Any deterioration in the unity of the body politic threatens its continued existence, a major concern for the political animals it encompasses.

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Assimilation is the default response to such sentiments. And while it is a commonly held belief, it’s also commonly misunderstood. By definition, assimilation requires a dominant culture for people to assimilate into. If no dominant culture exists, then either immigrants will exist in strong subcultures, furthering the disunity of the body politic, or will themselves establish the dominant culture—neither is true assimilation. But even with a dominant culture, it is simply not easy to facilitate the inculcation of virtue and the pedagogy of standards. Most immigrants are expected to guide their own education on these matters, a reality not always encouraged—a leading reason some people never really assimilate. For example, someone living in a country for a long period of time who never becomes proficient in the native tongue. This is a problem, as he will be out of place both in the workplace and at general social functions alike. If he is to be good, as he ought to be, it is incumbent upon him to participate in society. This is real work, not easily accomplished, relying heavily on the ability of an immigrant to persevere, among other traits. Once again, as is thematic, we must concern ourselves with the character of the immigrants. Of course, assimilation can be a very good thing when properly pursued, under the right circumstances. The varieties of culture can add a certain beauty to a country, and there is reason to believe that it may advance its strength and health as well; however, all within the bounds of reason, with full consideration of what the body politic can support and who is suitable.

Suffice to say, immigration can be harmful, to varying degrees, depending on the state of the body politic and the prospective immigrants. The ideologues who reduce immigration to an intrinsic good miss the mark (as they usually do). The nature of the danger, if it is to be fully understood for what it is, requires further examination of the circumstances, rooted in the fundamental political realities discussed here. I hope this article made evident not only particular dangers to look out for, but a basic sense of how to approach this issue.

There are many more related concerns worth addressing, but they will have to wait until a future date. Make sure to subscribe.

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Pro-choicers tend to predicate the abortion discussion on what is ultimately conjecture about available resources for mothers and their children. As the narrative goes, the mother exists in a dreadful world that is unsupportive and not at all conducive to her well-being. If abortion has anything to do with justice, it must be in the related injustice nature has subjected her to; all other considerations ought to be deferred until these matters are adequately addressed. In other words, unless external support is made available, abortion must be accessible. This view insufficiently addresses the core of the abortion issue, primarily in how it doesn’t account for the intentional killing of the child in the womb. But the purpose here is not to indulge in this egregious argumentative failure, but to discuss the support that exists today and some related misconceptions.

A few months ago, I participated in a panel discussion for donors at a pregnancy resource center in Georgia.1 Before the main event, I toured the facility. There were rooms organized for discussions, a medical room suitable for ultrasounds, and spaces with a welcoming sensibility. The site was stocked with an abundance of diapers, formula, clothes, and other goods. I suspect many would find all of this mundane, the expected qualities of one of the many charitable organizations doing good deeds, but it represents much more once you understand the current abortion debate.

One of the most common half-baked critiques of pro-lifers is that we “do not care about the baby once she is born.” Pro-life apologists often brush over these sentiments, typically because they are found embedded in poor arguments, but the genuine goal of caring for newborns is righteous—it is also one of the main objectives of pregnancy resource centers.

The Charlotte Lozier Institute (CLI) released its 2025 National Pregnancy Center Report which highlighted that 2,775 pregnancy centers nationwide provided over $452 million in total medical care, support and education services, and material goods in 2024. The fourth installment of CLI’s Legacy of Life & Love Series, this report demonstrates that pregnancy centers are serving women, men and families with unwavering care post-Dobbs and seeing continuous growth since CLI’s first national report in 2017.2

To better grasp the work that pregnancy resource centers do, it helps to compare them to Planned Parenthood. Both institutions are a sort of representation of each political position in the popular imagination, with pregnancy resource centers largely supported by pro-lifers and Planned Parenthood overwhelmingly supported by pro-choicers. It is also important to note that while Planned Parenthood is a national organization, pregnancy resource centers are localized, distinct entities.

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There are around 600 Planned Parenthood sites in the United States, fewer than one-quarter the number of pregnancy resource centers nationwide.3 Some of Planned Parenthood’s top services include STI tests, pregnancy tests, reversible contraception, and abortion.4 Generally, the top services for pregnancy resource centers are free and include diapers, baby clothes, consultations, and pregnancy testing.5 While pregnancy resource centers don’t offer abortions, Planned Parenthood executed 402,200 abortions over the course of one year.6

The table above provides a breakdown of the value of services and materials provided to clients of pregnancy resource centers in the United States.7

Pregnancy resource centers are not perfect. They are also not designed to replace the entirety of a mother’s natural obligation to her child, but to make it more manageable. Suffice to say, there is an expansive support apparatus available to assist mothers during and after pregnancy among local pregnancy resource centers across the country. And the mere existence of these sites demonstrates that pro-lifers do care for the baby once she is born.

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That said, resources are not always enough, as the hypothetical pro-choice remark implies. For the mother to be served, she must adopt the appropriate posture. It may sound trivial, but no matter how many resources are available, she will still have to willfully engage with the organization to receive them. Picking up baby formula or new baby clothes requires physically driving to the facility and following the site’s process. She may have family issues going on—as many mothers who consider or who have considered abortion do—and could benefit from targeted guidance. This would again require concrete action on her part. The resources and support infrastructure are meaningless unless mothers are willing to participate.

As discussed at the center I visited, some women are made aware of the support available but still deny service, sometimes due to external pressures. Others will cancel appointments because they have already procured an abortion. Pro-choicers wield the notion of support, as if such a system can be expected to solve the abortion issue, but in reality, we already have a stable charitable network in place. Yet, mothers still decide to walk away, leaving an abundance of resources on the table, as it were.

Pregnancy-related resources target different forms of poverty of the mother. There is the material category, which is generally the easiest to mend. It’s the basics, like formula and clothes. Then there is immaterial support, which, in essence, targets the spirit of the women; guidance and education are fitting to consider here. Mothers who willingly reject assistance and instead choose abortion are poor in spirit. Her deficiency is found deep within her soul, which might follow from ignorance or a severely misaligned will. There’s a tendency to suggest that simply better external conditions would alleviate or eliminate abortion, but even an unlimited amount of resources could not guarantee change within such a person.

“For you always have the poor with you, but you will not always have me.”(Matthew 26:11)

We will never completely eliminate poverty. Because we have those poor in character, when you make a vicious act like abortion easily accessible—especially when you paint it as a virtue—mothers will choose it. Here, one can better see the importance of pursuing not only charitable community initiatives, as discussed presently, but also political change aimed at circumventing grave evils. Unfortunately, even in better societal circumstances, abortions will still happen, albeit in much smaller numbers.

However, we don’t pursue justice and charity because they are guaranteed to bring about a desired positive outcome, but because they are goods in themselves. When we align our person in such a way, we begin to understand the rationality of our cause. This seemed implicit in the work and motivations of the staff I met in Georgia. They care about the pro-life position, but their work transcends any sort of preoccupation with political goals. Consistently, they serve the most vulnerable, and although some will turn away from an extended hand, the mission continues without hindrance; their focus is on doing good and avoiding evil. A beautiful approach that, interestingly enough, is incompatible with abortion.

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I apologize for sending this post out twice; I mistakenly deleted the original.

Last month, I traveled south to Georgia to participate in a banquet for a local pregnancy resource center—what follows is a recap of my day and a brief reflection.

The morning began with a tour of the resource center itself. Observing what the site had to offer—from an abundance of baby clothes to an exceptional staff—encouraged a deeper appreciation for the work involved in serving mothers. Next, I went over to Kennesaw State University to have some impromptu abortion discussions with students, which were largely productive. Finally, I ended the day with a panel discussion at the banquet. Here, I shared insight into my pro-life work and commented on relevant cultural matters. It was wonderful to see so many people willing to donate.

The entire day was an image of the pro-life movement. The morning featured an active support operation for mothers in need; midday brought me to present the pro-life argument with young adults; and the evening was focused on getting people involved. Each of these components is critical and must be adequately attended to if we are to be successful.

I want to thank Christy and Melissa of Paulding Pregnancy Resource Center for being such gracious hosts. For those interested, I have linked their organization below. In my next article, I will afford more attention to my morning tour.

Paulding Pregnancy Resource Center

I have been thinking about how we ought to navigate the death of a good man, from making sense of his passing to the necessary response. This brought to mind the ending of Edward Feser’s most recent book, Immortal Souls. I will include a few passages here, accompanied by my own comments.

For, again, it is only when the soul is conjoined with the body that we have a complete substance. The disembodied soul is in an unnatural state, and aims or points toward the having of its body as its natural condition. It would be most odd if the soul were forever frustrated in this natural tendency - if union with the body lasted only for the fleeting, earliest portion of its unending existence.1

When a death occurs, it’s normal for people to register their unsolicited thoughts, from asking who this person really was to constructing their life narrative. While there is a time for proper inquiry and characterization of a man, especially a highly accomplished one, the immediate aftermath should be marked by deep reflection on his demise.

After all, death is the most unnatural experience for one to be subjected to. At its core, it’s divisive, taking the person who is a composite of body and soul and severing their unity—death is bad. Of course, there’s an oddity to it that we sense ought to be remedied. However, we must not ignore the severity of the loss, even though it may bear a crushing weight; that’s the burden the moment requires.

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Another thing philosophy can tell us is that if a resurrection were to occur, only God could bring it about. That, in any event, was Aquinas’s view. Natural material causes can no more reunite soul and body than they could generate a soul in the first place. Nor could even an angelic intellect reunite a soul and its body, since angels can only manipulate natural causes, even if they can do so more powerfully than we can. Now, if we consider the fittingness of resurrection together with divine power, goodness, and wisdom, we have the ingredients for an argument to the effect that God can be expected to restore bodies to souls.2

A disembodied soul is unsettling, which encourages an inclination toward the resurrection of the body. This leads some to want to resurrect the recently departed on this side of heaven. But you can’t—we are powerless in this domain. And it seems to be a disservice to attempt to do the impossible here, as well as disrespectful. While on this Earth, that person habituated virtue in a way manifestly their own, and that deserves reverence.

We entrust our desire for resurrection into the hands of God, for he is the only source capable of such a feat. This is not to stifle inspiration. Instead, to respect the way in which virtue is practiced incarnate and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the circumstances that have been divinely prescribed. We don’t force ourselves into a mold, but rather act in accord with what will advance the perfection of our own person, with complete faith in the importance of that character in the story God has canvassed. This is where inspiration is most impactful: when it encourages one to participate more fully in the personal plan God has for him.

I couldn’t recommend reading this book enough, especially for those interested in human nature; it has served me well indeed. To close, I will include its final paragraph for you to gnaw on.

Suffice it to say that philosophy can take us as far as showing not only that the soul is immortal but that its reunion with the body is to be expected. That’s pretty far - further even than Plato dared go in the Phaedo. But here we reach the limits of what philosophy can by itself establish. If we are to go further, we will have to look for evidence of some special divine revelation about the details of the soul’s life after death and the resurrection of its body. It seems relevant to point out in closing that there is one religion, and only one, that grounds its claim to divine provenance precisely on evidence that one such Resurrection has already occurred.3

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Some pro-choicers form their abortion stances around the point that the human inside the woman experiences pain, which occurs at about twenty weeks of gestation. This is what we may call a sensory experience—it’s constituted by information from the sense organs. I will demonstrate how particular arguments grounded in this idea are inimical to a pro-choice conclusion.

Pro-choicers frequently argue that the unborn human is not worthy of moral consideration until she is having a sensory experience. But this is unreasonable. Consider a baby that is born into a coma and is not actively experiencing anything. Would it follow that the lack of sensation means it is permissible to kill the baby? Of course not—no one would seriously argue that a recently born baby is not a moral agent because she lacks sensation. At this point, pro-choicers often pivot their attention to the location of the baby and how that makes the comparison disanalogous. But this is to say nothing about the sufficiency of active sensory experience in our moral considerations, which is the current object of our attention.

Pro-choicers will sometimes argue that it’s not an active sensory experience that grounds moral worth, but rather the capability for such. Within the coma hypothetical above, they might say that the recently conceived human does not have the capability to deploy a sensory experience, but a baby in a coma does have said capability. Therefore, it is acceptable to kill the recently conceived human but not the one in a coma.

Let’s formulate a fundamental understanding of capability to address this argument adequately. Capability is always in reference to a way in which a being may actually exist; we may use it differently, but every proper usage will maintain this necessary aspect. Consider burning your tongue on a scalding hot drink—when your tongue comes into contact with the liquid, the pain experienced is present in what we might call an actual way. Of course, you can remove your tongue, and eventually, that feeling will cease. But that pain can return—you have the capability to burn your tongue again on the liquid. Both our capability—our potential—to experience pain and the actuality of experiencing it are fundamental to our being.

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This is not to say that it must always be actualized. It may be the case that for the rest of your life, you will never be exposed to an extremely hot drink again. It wouldn’t then follow that you are no longer fundamentally in possession of the capability to experience the burn produced by those circumstances—that is still a very real aspect of what you are.

Similarly, the human recently conceived and the human in a coma can both be said to possess the capability to experience sensation. While it is true that the recently conceived human is not in the proper circumstances for such an experience to be actualized, it cannot be said that her being is fundamentally incapable of such an experience; under the suitable particulars, that feature tends to come about. This is then problematic for the pro-choice position, as all humans, including the unborn, are always in possession of this fundamental capability.

Continuing with the hypothetical coma scenario, a pro-choicer may prefer a more specific characterization of capability. She may even be inclined to the metaphysical merit of a capability being some sort of fundamental potential of a being, but is more interested in how the term is commonly used. She may reason that the human outside the womb—though not actively sensing—is closer to deploying a sensory experience, which makes the being capable in a way that the recently conceived human is not. Of course, we may be entirely in the dark as to when the baby in the coma will have sensation, but it could occur instantaneously, which is not the case for a recently conceived human. Thus, because of the lack of this sort of capability, there is no wrongness in aborting the recently conceived human.

The idea that the experience feels more attainable may make depriving a being of such more wrong. However, for that to be the case, there must be a wrongness in depriving a human of specifically actualizing a sensory experience. Otherwise, the explanatory power would have to come simply from the fact that an actuality is being denied. But it is not per se wrong to prohibit the actualization of something; there are plenty of powers within our nature that ought to be suppressed.

Since there must be wrongness in intentionally prohibiting a human from actualizing a sensory experience, there is wrongness in aborting the recently conceived human. While said experience may be understood as a distant outcome, an abortion still denies its realization. Thus, this pro-choice framework must reckon with this unavoidable issue.

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My thoughts here are a perfectly satisfactory introduction to the problems with common pro-choice positions related to sensation. There is much more to discuss—don’t forget to subscribe.

Those familiar with the abortion debate will have heard a pro-choicer use the seed analogy to advance his position. The analogy is deployed by first describing the relationship between a seed and a tree; they are distinct insofar as the seed is not the tree, and connected since the seed can become a tree. The human embryo, then, is said to be like the seed here, and the tree akin to a further developed human being. The pro-choicer concludes that because we tend to find greater importance in the tree, there is no reason to give the embryo the same moral considerations as the further developed human being.

The argument's conclusion obviously does not map onto our understanding of humanity; one is expected to give moral consideration in accord with how developed a human is. Even the most seasoned pro-choicer couldn't possibly affirm the validity of this principle. If one were asked, for example, who is more deserving of life between a one-year-old and a ten-year-old, it would be universally unacceptable to argue that the ten-year-old is more deserving of moral consideration because he is more developed.

The pro-choicer might endeavor to avoid this issue by claiming that the analogy is not about appealing to an abstract notion of development, but rather to elucidate a specific characteristic of a human that, when actually present, endows one with moral consideration. However, it is hard to see how this analogy evinces such a truth; there is nothing in its presentation that explains what quality of the tree is indicative of greater importance than the seed. Moreover, the thrust of the argument is driven by a comparison of developmental progress, not the merit of a specific trait. If a pro-choicer desires to argue that moral consideration of human beings is based on an actually present trait, he is welcome to do so, but it is not fitting to use the analogy as presented.

Then there is the issue of the substantial difference between the nature of a tree and a human. The pro-choicer is expecting us to derive the moral weight of a human, who can possess moral weight (I say always does), from a being that can never have moral weight, a tree. But that is not the proper use of the analogy; one cannot derive whether a being has a particular quality through an analogy with a being that will never possess that quality. This is not to say that one cannot learn something about humans by understanding trees, but only insofar as their similarities in nature allow. We can, for example, learn about what it means to grow by relating a tree and a human, but we can't come to understand what it means to conceptualize through this relation—trees don't think.

Until now, we have assumed a seamless association between concepts of importance and moral consideration. However, this was only done to maintain the integrity of the ambiguous and incorrect approach that pro-choicers typically adopt when arguing with this analogy. There is no necessary relation between importance, usually defined with respect to a value system, and what is moral. The phenomenon of preferring the tree over the seed seems better explained by our natural inclination for the perfect; the tree is a more complete instantiation of its organism than the seed.

The sentiments expressed should not discourage the use of natural analogies. They are reliable tools that provide an understanding of how reality is organized. In this one, both the unborn baby and the seed are life forms in their earliest stages, requiring nourishment to develop into their final forms—that's a legitimate similarity to derive knowledge from. To avoid erroneous conclusions, one must abstract with respect to the nature of the organisms in question, not drawing relations where there is no likeness. Generally, that encapsulates the error the pro-choicer makes with this analogy.

The content creator is devoted to consistently churning out online material. Consistency is the key differentiator between the average social media consumer, who may post occasionally, and someone who is cultivating online content production. Without this basic structuring, the concept is rendered formless, losing its essence. Content creators are not required to direct their products at some good. Instead, content for the sake of engagement, absent merit with respect to an honorable end, is sufficient.

But this is a dubious function, to say the least, especially considering the deceptive landscape of social media. I find that much of the popular internet content is highly developed with media effects, professional scenery, rehearsed lines, and then paired with an underdeveloped or erroneous point. Although this type of material is fundamentally lackluster, it still performs well in the high-paced online environment. These circumstances burden the consumer's intellect, serving to distract from the underlying merit of a post. Before he can discover what is really in front of him, he is whisked away to another piece of content, where he will again be starved of an adequate amount of time to digest what he is being fed.

Surely it would be too bold to say that appearances should be neglected because of their ability to deceive. The incarnate reality of mankind often calls for a fastidious approach to perfecting the appearance of an object to reveal its genuine reality better. For example, physical church buildings frequently have beautiful features that direct the eyes upward. Consequently, a sense of divinity is imparted on the beholder, bringing harmony with the fundamental purpose of the church: to elevate one to heaven.

The most significant incentive for the content creator is engagement, which critically relies on the appearance of their work. And through engagement, content creators are granted their influential rank in our society, varied, of course, by how much engagement has been attained. However, it only makes sense to bestow authority to those we suspect of harboring a virtuous character, for without virtue, authority is undeserved. Can it be said that the acquisition of engagement justifies said honor?

The short answer is no, simply because there is nothing in the pursuit of engagement or in its possession that necessitates virtue. Whether we like it or not, these content creators become authoritative voices in our ever-changing political community seemingly on the grounds of successfully playing the content role. The achieved notoriety only further advances their social rank because of the positive prejudice consumers tend to have for popular online figures.

The nature of this problem is not entirely new. Human beings have always struggled with the deceptive charm of destructive work. So often, man has fallen for the incantatory speech of a seasoned rhetorician instead of the more reasonable servant of the good. And this will continue to happen, regardless of any solution facilitated.

Social media, however, exacerbates the problem because the technology encourages creators to be intertwined with our everyday lives. Consider the following historical circumstances. Someone visits a public space once a week to listen to a talented speaker and, between each occasion, enjoys the appropriate amount of time to reflect on what was said. The speaker may be of good character, but he could also be very deficient. Either way, you and the other community members have sufficient time to vet him. For him to transcend into a greater communal role, he will naturally deal with this degree of scrutiny. Now, consider a similar situation set in our current public square. You, the community member, are constantly being fed the work of that same kind of person in a dramatically increased way. You not only hear his voice in the evening, but multiple times a day. And not just his voice, but 20 more who are similar. You become so overwhelmed by the abundance of content in front of you that you are incapable of exercising rational deliberation concerning a single one of these individuals. Then, before you know it, this group of people is rapidly expanding their reach into any mind available to penetrate. Most consumers allow this exchange without affording the necessary time to evaluate the validity of such an arrangement.

You can't opt out of this inextricable relationship. This is what society entails. Being plugged into the social media environment, at least minimally, is required to stay with the relevant discourse. Therefore, we ought to care about the true character of these creators. The public seems to be operating as if the acquired social presence of these creators is deserved simply because it has been obtained. That is not necessarily true.

In the past, we had institutions that protected the integrity of the public domain by promoting not only ideas that conduce to the common good but also noble people who would likely promote it. This is not hardline censorship, but rather the favoring of concepts and people that are suspected to benefit society. Unfortunately, these institutions have eroded.

One of which is the university. Historically, universities have played a role in shaping the communal discourse. Those who were privileged to receive a university education were given the baseline respect accorded with such activity, analogous to how we view the average successful content creator today. In a principled sense, it is more reasonable for the graduate to be bestowed with influence than the content creator because universities are designed to form the highest class of citizens. In contrast, the content creator achieves the rank through a less restrained engagement pursuit, which in itself does not say much about his character or the substantive quality of his work. Neither way is perfect. Many men of history have attended prestigious schools, yet have done horrible things or have not been worth their salt. Even today, there is an abundance of non-serious academics who attempt to advance ideas behind the labels of intellectually malnourished educational establishments. Nonetheless, it would be better to have universities that are committed to producing ideal men than to be deprived of such institutions.

Another idea that can be drawn from the depths of Western society is patronage. Similar to universities, it exists today in a certain sense, but ought to be strengthened. This is difficult to implement, as it is deeply contingent on the culture of the time. Nonetheless, small steps may be taken. For example, more seasoned creators could focus resources on developing the platforms of deserving young creators. It is typical for cross-collaboration to occur between such entities, but it seems to be guided by popularity. And a single occasion hardly qualifies as sufficient in progressing young talent. We need more men who are willing to promote these individuals, while rejecting those who are not fit for such responsibility.

Someone might propose a more radical approach that involves exercising absolute control over the social media applications to determine what is permissible to circulate. While the nature of the algorithms is up for inquiry and might legitimately be subject to the community in some way, I won't entertain ideas spirited by revolutionary lust, that have yet to be touched by an ounce of prudence. The public conversation must always retain a strong organic quality that respects human free will. While exercising more control over this environment might be appropriate, we must be aware of the severe harm that follows from a perversion of that course of action.

There is much development to be done here. The reader should reflect deeply about the creators he supports online via his consumption practices. It might seem far-fetched now, but the social authority garnered by these creators today, many of whom are young, will naturally propel them into more powerful political roles in the future. Which is to say, this is the breeding ground for the next generation of leaders. But even so, in their current social ranks, they are shaping and driving the culture today.

I am not waging a war against desire wholesale, but instead, on desire absent reason. Discussing sexual desire will suffice for the present point. Sex is great, but not absolutely. Consider someone who is sexually violated. The reader will likely think of the egregious evil of rape. This is undoubtedly an unreasonable action that is born from a perverted sexual appetite.

But violation of the sexual kind can also be exhibited in other ways. Consider a woman who is in a consensual relationship. The man who pursues her only does so because he sees her as an object to quench his lustful urge. To him, she is no longer perceived as a woman, which is indicative of not only a material existence but some higher rational form, but now is understood as useful flesh. Sex here has been corrupted in the way that it has caused the man to reduce the woman down to an object, not conceptualizing her as what she genuinely embodies. For most, this will be an obvious, unreasonable use of sexual desire. 

The appetite for sex is generally neutral, but in these particulars, it manifests irrationally. How, then, do we make sense of the rationality of an instance of a desire? Surely not all cases are as easy to judge as the previous examples.

First, let's start by considering how we should approach desire. The moral life requires properly organizing our appetites in their hierarchical place, with the highest and most rational of those being directed at our fulfillment. Appetite is reasonable insofar as it is in accord with that ultimate inclination. The appetite for food is helpful to investigate here. Those who benefit from food the most are not those who obsess over it. Overeating adds harmful weight to one's body. Nor is it those who ignore food. Your body requires a basic set of nutritional standards to function correctly. Instead, it is those who temper their natural craving. This is because the virtue of temperance, when applied to our appetite for food, enables proper moderation with respect to what we eat, how much we eat, etc. When manifested, it makes the inclination to eat reasonable. Virtue can be generally understood as our path to act in the right way for the right reasons. Or, in a more rudimentary way, to be reasonable.

The attentive reader will not find a condemnation of sex or the other appetites generally, but an elucidation of how they do not suffice as a rational explanation. One cannot intelligently lay the foundation of their dating pursuit purely on something that has no built-in intellectual guardrails. But this is precisely what modern liberalism encourages people to do! 

While I will not do so here, I could spend a considerable amount of time critiquing the numerous childish aims people use to justify their relationships. All of these will share a universal quality: if left unbridled by virtue, they cannot be said to be intelligent pursuits. However, higher principles that are in themselves conducive to our flourishing, when adhered to, are always rational. Yes, virtue is always the answer! So then, what is reasonable about dating?

The Real Purpose

Marriage. I wish that one-word sentence carried the intellectual and societal importance it traditionally has. But let's not dwell on the past; instead, let's recover some of the basics of this eternal institution that serves us so well.

Naturally, marriage is the union of a man and a woman, directed towards procreation and the education of children. For the vast majority of people, marriage is what you should pursue. Simply, because it will enable a more virtuous life. Unifying with the opposite sex is a natural inclination. Feeding that tendency in the right way is what the natural institution of marriage is all about.

Now, some people are better suited for other lifestyles, mainly those in religious vocations. But it must be said that these paths are not in contradiction with the natural order that directs people to marriage, nor is it as ubiquitous as the necessity of marriage in the life of the masses. Instead, it is a calling that transcends into a higher realm, building off natural principles that make something like marriage fruitful, and putting a particular type of focus on the divine. In this way, there is clear congruence in the two primary ways of living, no contradiction in principle, but a distinction nonetheless.

Proper dating, then, is the process one undertakes to reach marriage, which is a reasonable end. Remember, this cannot be said about an understanding of dating built on those neutral inclinations previously discussed. However, you can make the statement here because when marriage is realized, virtue is the fruit that is produced. And if you speak to those marked by the traditional vision of marriage, it yields it in abundance.

Is that all?

My goal has been to challenge the liberal view of dating. I demonstrated how one of the more commonly deployed desires that liberals ground their dating life in (sex) is not, per se, intelligent. By dissecting this desire, we can learn how other typical desires typically empowered by a liberal worldview also fall short.

This demonstrates a significant issue with what we might call the "personal" philosophical implications of the liberal dating view. But nothing is really just personal. Liberalism is a political ideology, and I would be the worst conservative in the world if I did not give time to the broader social implications of liberal dating. Which is to say, if it is a "stupid endeavor", then we should expect liberalism not only to produce an unreasonable dating ideology but also to suffer from politically poor outcomes.

For that further exploration, you'll need to drop a follow/subscribe wherever you are reading this and wait for part 2. For now, individuals who adopt a liberalistic view of dating are being irrational.

The pro-choice position is laced with absurdities and typically includes contradictions with the pro-choicer’s own worldview. One of the most glaring errors is found among abortion defenders who believe that the pro-abortion position is a pro-woman position. In reality, that is far from the truth.

The natural orientation of a woman is the generation and nurturing of children. This intrinsic reality is the most rudimentary way to grasp womanhood and how it is manifested.

This is not to say that women are purely their ability to reproduce. That reductionist account would fail to consider how a woman is of the rational kind. The sexual distinction is primarily understood through how one is designed to participate in procreation, but people have intrinsic ends that extend well beyond reproduction. This, of course, is as true for men as it is for women.

Now, pro-choicers often argue that their position is pro-woman because it enables women to choose to kill their own children. Of course, they typically package this in a rhetorically friendlier way, using euphemisms such as “the choice over one’s own body.” This is far from a fair representation of the situation, as abortion is the direct, intentional killing of an unborn child. If one could make a strong case for a political position by simply appealing to choice as a good in itself, then any position could have merit. However, some choices, like this one, are untenable.

The supposed pro-woman person who defends the abortion position is, in principle, making an argument that is anti-woman. Remember, the natural distinction of womanhood is most fundamentally understood by her orientation toward bearing children, as briefly discussed above. The pro-choicer is advocating for women to be able to kill their children at the stage of development where the baby is most intimately intertwined with the mother’s body. This is the stage of a woman’s life where, at the most basic level, driven by the sexual distinction, her being is ordered.

Therefore, in principle, pro-choicers are arguing for the ability of women to put a perverted end to what most fundamentally makes a woman a woman. It is perverted because it is not the fulfillment of what pregnancy is directed toward, that being the birth of a healthy baby. Instead, it is an invasive process that kills a mother’s unborn child and forces the now-dead baby from the womb. Simply put, to procure an abortion is to work directly against the intrinsic directiveness of the mother that is guiding the pregnancy.

While this ironic absurdity is useful to point out, I would not base an entire argument on it. After all, while this discussion reveals another erroneous and problematic view held by pro-choicers, the child losing their life is a more severe evil and requires less philosophical groundwork to define.

At the very least, if you have not already, be confident in the fact that the pro-life position is the pro-woman position. Most of these pro-choicers could not tell you what a woman is, but if they could, it would be impossible for their argument to be pro-woman.

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This is my inaugural weekly newsletter. The purpose of this letter is to give a short recap of the previous week and provide insight into the work of the coming week.

A New Initiative

Most of my pro-life work up until this point has been online focused. I’ve had hundreds of conversations with pro-choicers, changed many minds, and had a lot of fun doing it. Do not fret, the streams are not going anywhere.

Moving forward, I am going to exert energy toward educating and preparing communities in New York on all things pro-life. My effort will begin with parishes on Long Island, so if you would like me to get involved in your parish, potentially by hosting a pro-life workshop, please reach out!

Clip of the Week

Last week, I enjoyed engaging with more pro-choicers on stream. One moment that stood out was a discussion on the “interest” an unborn baby does or does not have. It was a great conversation, check it out below.

Tweet of the Week

(Click here to be taken to the post)

Support My Work

If you’re looking to support me further, consider following me on other social media platforms and/or donating through Buy Me a Coffee.

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Thanks for taking the time! Have a blessed Holy Week.

Best,

James.

However, there are serious philosophical issues with this faction. In this work, I will consider one of the most glaring problems, that being the opposition to incremental political progress with respect to ending abortion.

The abolitionist movement, according to their official website, has five tenets. The fifth tenet is titled “immediate and uncompromising.” Analysis of this tenet will suffice to demonstrate the error in their position.

“Immediate and uncompromising” is the fifth listed tenet on the official abolitionist website and is screenshotted above.

Let us proceed by working through different lines from the tenet itself.

“We believe that allowing abortion in some cases along the way to its total abolition is neither strategically sound nor consistently Christian.”

In this sentence, two separate views have been posited. Firstly, that incrementalism is not “strategically sound.” Secondly, abolitionists hold that incrementalism is not “consistently Christian.”

On the matter of the poor strategic approach of incrementalism, I will say very little. To say that this approach is less politically effective than the general pro-life approach requires an investigation that I encourage you to pursue. Most of this work will instead consider the notion that incrementalism is not “consistently Christian.” This should not give the impression that strategy is unimportant, but rather focus on the more preeminent question of the legitimacy of incrementalism in principle. If something is disordered in principle, then no practical considerations will suffice to make it justified in itself.

“We reject incremental abolition, the and the gradual regulation of evil. This fight is not an issue of what seems practical, achievable, or reasonable. It is an issue of obedience to God.”

The rejection of “incremental abolition” may potentially oppose the good. Therefore, it should not be outright rejected. For example, if a person is capable of passing a law that stops the majority of intentional killings of the unborn, and thus pursues it with the intention of protecting innocent life, he has done good. In this way, the action is properly ordered. If, for example, he supports everything the previous law does and institutes moral legitimacy to the other intentional killings of the unborn, this is contrary to the good. To kill an unborn child is intrinsically evil and thus cannot be justified.

Moreover, incrementalism can be understood both in an erroneous way and a proper way. The aim should never be to protect in our positive law the practice of killing the unborn. This action is always intrinsically evil. A justified incrementalist approach would result in laws that prohibit and limit abortions while not supporting legislation that explicitly protects the killing of the unborn.

Absolutely rejecting this approach, when it is most properly pursued, would mean one may be rejecting the good. Ontologically, the action that is pursued is good in itself. God, being the infinite good, means that the action is in some way reflective of God himself. But abolitionists reject this action. Therefore, abolitionists, by opposing “incremental abolition,” assuming it is done correctly, will have opposed God to some degree.

On whether this battle is not about being practical, this is a contradiction to what was implied previously, that being that incrementalism is not the optimal practical approach. Therefore, considerations surely have been given to the practical merit of the abolitionist case.

The notion that the “fight” that abolitionists engage in on this issue is not reasonable is in itself an absurdity. If accepted to be true, it would invalidate their entire argument. An argument void of reason would be no argument at all, for an argument requires a process of reasoning. Secondly, this is contradictory to how abolitionists act. Abolitionists utilize exegesis and attempt cogent argumentation to demonstrate their case.

On obedience to God, we must discuss what this means. Ultimate obedience is when the human will is in alignment with the divine will. This is fully realized in the beatific vision or heaven.

What then does the pursuit of incrementalism have on a person's will? Well, we must understand the nature of the pursuit itself. By choosing to do the good of saving the innocent, with the intention of protecting the innocent, a person's will is brought closer to the divine will. If one chooses to do this good with the previous reason and with the intention to glorify God, a person's will is brought into greater alignment with the divine will.

As we can see, to what degree the will is corrected will depend first on the action itself and then the circumstances surrounding it. For incrementalists who pursue it in the most orderly way, who don't have immoral intentions for pursuing the good but do pursue it, the habitualization of their approach will result in some degree of correction of their wills.

“God never accepts a gradual repentance of sin (individually or nationally) but rather demands a radical cutting off and turning towards Christ alone in total faith. Jesus declared to sinners, ‘Go, and sin no more.’ (John 8:11) Repentance is not an evolutionary transition from darkness to light over time. Repentance is a complete reversal of belief, thought, and action.”

It is true that God does not accept a gradual repentance of sin. But this is not what the incrementalist does.

The incrementalist first must discern what is eternally true about the abortion issue. Here he finds that abortion is unjustified. Then, he considers whether or not this injustice should be permissible. He shall consider both the gravity of the evil and its political implications. What he will discern is that it is both a grave tragedy and inimical to the flourishing of the political community. Thus, he will seek to end the injustice.

However, he does not begin with a blank slate but examines the political tradition inherited by the community and the current landscape. After all, man is a political animal. He then engages in an intellectual investigation as to what is the best way to deal with this injustice. He may find that complete abolition is not feasible, therefore opting for a compromise. This entire process ought to be guided first by divine revelation. 

If he decides on incrementalism for his political approach, he will not have necessarily “gradually repented” of his sin. He would have chosen an approach that produces good, which is not disordered or sinful in itself. In no way has he necessarily affirmed a notion contrary to human dignity, justice, or goodness.

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The focus here was to provide a brief explanation of how opposing a proper view of incrementalism in principle is irrational, therefore making it incompatible with Christianity. This was done by demonstrating how incrementalism, properly pursued, is in itself not necessarily contrary to the good; rather, enables participation in it. 

Some might implore that a defense of the current implementation of incrementalism is required to show that its opposition is truly irrational. But this would be mistaken. The claim commonly made against incrementalism, and reiterated in the official abolitionist text above, is that it is contrary to Christianity itself, which is first and foremost a matter of principle.

Conflicting Principles

Let us consider a typical abortion case that involves a healthy mother and a healthy unborn baby, where the mother electively aborts the child. Allow for the principle of bodily autonomy, the ability to self-govern, to be violated when a woman is denied an abortion. I hold that no such violation occurs in this case, but this will be discussed in the next section. Are there any other principles that one violates when committing an abortion? The most obvious one is the killing of a child who ought not to be killed. No matter what the woman involved says on the matter, she will be ending the life of her child for reasons that would be unacceptable if the child existed outside of the womb. Consider the two most common reasons that individuals procure abortions. One is family planning, which is a highly euphemistic way to describe exterminating your children to position yourself more in line with a desired life outcome. Two is birth control, which is not only perverted because, in principle, birth control frustrates the sexual act but also because a child is already created and killing her is a confused application of the principle. These two reasons alone certainly would never justify killing a child who is outside the womb. While one derives the force of their argument from bodily autonomy, the most common reasons for getting an abortion are violations of other appreciated principles, namely, don’t slaughter your child because you don’t want them to exist.

Let us proceed with the conversation with the interlocutor that sparked this reflection. She was willing to concede that a mother aborting her baby is wrong, violating what would be just treatment of the child, as we reasoned above for ourselves. Unfortunately, she still believed abortion should be acceptable because bodily autonomy was being “violated.” The question now must be raised: if the principle of bodily autonomy is violated, as well as a principle that governs what is just killing or, specifically, in this case, how a mother ought to treat a child, then which carries more weight? If killing a child is more essential, then abortion could never be allowed, and vice versa, with the concept of bodily autonomy. To fully understand this question, we must grasp why these principles exist in the first place. Both, to their core, if they are to be valid, must be in line with the natural tendency towards happiness. Which is to say, if they do not work towards a person’s flourishing, then they would not be principles worth considering. Remember, my interlocutor agreed that happiness is the end that validates or grounds a principle. However, how do we know which principle is more destructive with respect to our inclination to be happy?

I will propose a reductio ad absurdum that demonstrates how the killing of your child is a greater evil than some bodily autonomy infringement. Consider a mother with her child in a location without social services or family members who could care for her child. You could imagine a mother temporarily snowed in or maybe recovering from a hurricane. Would it follow that she is not obligated to care for the child because she is the only one who may do so? Of course not, the obligation, or what she should do, is to care for her baby. Now, consider that the baby required breast milk from her mother to survive, and if she did not provide it, the baby would die. Obviously, the mother ought to let the baby breastfeed. If she did not, and the baby consequentially died, then the mother would be viewed as intentionally neglectful, having acted in a morally wrong way when she denied her breastmilk to her child. In this situation, the position that bodily autonomy would justify allowing you to let your child die is untenable. I want to briefly address the most common refutation to this scenario. From my reasoning, some will conclude that if you are the sole person who needs something from someone to live, then someone is obligated to give it to you. However, this blatantly disregards key real features of the world, including teleology and the importance of relationships between humans. Neither will be explained further here as they are not essential for the present point. What is most crucial is that in the case presented above, one would be committing a greater wrong in the denial of their breastmilk and/or general care than any account of wrong due to a so-called bodily autonomy violation.

At this point, most pro-lifers are willing to accept this exchange as progress towards convincing the interlocutor to support the pro-life position. Some might falsely assume that the discussion is entirely over. While significant ground has been made, and there is a good chance the interlocutor is now pro-life, there are still necessary considerations on the table. Even though it has been shown that one should not kill their unborn child, this “sacred bodily autonomy” violation is still looming over our heads. Remember, up until now, we have assumed that one’s bodily autonomy may possibly be violated during pregnancy. If you are being violated in a fundamental way that denies you a “right,” a plausible political argument likely exists to protect that entitlement. But of course, this is not the case when a legitimate authority stops you from killing your child in the womb. Furthermore, bodily autonomy, as commonly espoused by pro-choicers, is almost all but a myth. Let us proceed with our considerations about bodily autonomy to understand if it finds itself grounded in our world.

The Ruse of Bodily Autonomy

Bodily autonomy concerns the mother’s ability to self-govern. I take it to be different from a conceived notion of bodily integrity, which is rooted in what it fundamentally means to be whole or complete. However, this is outside the scope of this article. Let us now address the fundamental assumption in the previous section: bodily autonomy is needed to secure human flourishing.

Does human flourishing require the utmost power to do whatever act is necessary, even that which is found in the depths of degeneracy or perverts what is intelligible as good? Certainly not. For example, having the power to end your own life would, if actualized, not result in human flourishing but rather in the death of the being. Or consider having the ability to abuse the worst of drugs. Being in the sprawl of addiction is not in accord with what it means to be in a state of fulfillment. Nor would it be reasonable to assume that allowing a mother to kill her sleeping infant would work towards her happiness. Therefore, having the power to commit the maximum number of actions is not a requirement for human flourishing. On the contrary, it seems that restrictions ought to be in place to protect yourself from self-destruction. How might we understand the “self-government” aspect of bodily autonomy? Consider someone who is not able to play a role in their government. Does it follow that they are now unable to flourish? This is clearly false; if the government does everything just and good with respect to you, then they will not limit your own flourishing.

We have attacked the basic antecedent premises of liberalism, which is the foundation of any sort of bodily autonomy argument. Liberalism holds that man ought to be free from his natural environment, his political community, and, as we see in the transhumanist movement, even the operating principles that govern one’s nature. However, the true aim of all valid principles that both the interlocutor and I accept is human happiness. Human happiness is not achieved through maximizing one’s ability to do whatever one desires. To pull from a previous example, it is not necessary for human flourishing to have the ability to do hard-core drugs, and it can be assumed to be counterproductive. Thus, maximizing one’s autonomy over one's actions does not in itself achieve the intended aim, human happiness, nor is a conception of self-government necessary for human flourishing.

The depths of the erroneous placement of bodily autonomy extend further. Society is not simply a construct of man but is a natural place where he finds himself. From trading to finding love to enjoying the arts to relying on others for food and water, the importance of community is undeniable when considering human action. It then follows that man being dependent on community necessitates a flourishing community for man to flourish. If the community suffers, then man would suffer. Man being a social animal by virtue of his own nature proves this point to be obviously true.

None of this is to say that man should not be free. Any suggestion that I have said the contrary will have been purely imagined by the reader and find its basis nowhere in this text. I find it imperative that, within reason, man be as free as possible. The ruse of bodily autonomy is that its liberal conception is necessary for man to be fulfilled. However, a man may simultaneously benefit from guard rails that protect his freedom and the roadblocks that stop him from committing evil. It is conceivable that a society exists that protects an individual’s freedom while being ordered to the common good. Bodily autonomy grants entitlements for wrongs that frustrate the end that all human action is directed towards: happiness. Thus, bodily autonomy, as pro-choicers commonly understand it, is flawed and fails to justify an action by itself, most certainly not abortion.

At this point, I have had hundreds of discussions with pro-choicers. The conversations have varied in their degree of intellectual rigor, as well as their abortion-related direction. Most pro-lifers who speak on the morality of abortion rely heavily on invoking natural rights that they believe are bestowed upon human beings. The goal typically is to demonstrate that a child in the womb has a “right to life” being violated during an abortion. But I have taken a different approach, one that I have found to be more convincing, less tedious to demonstrate to be true, and easier to grasp for the typical person. This approach is to scope the conversation to be about justifying the act of abortion. Some users of the natural right to life may also appeal to justice. However, I find that they can do so only insofar as they can establish their rights framework as coherent and true. But this is no trivial task, as many pro-lifers often seem to suspect, and brings forth much baggage we can do without.

I want to clarify what I am not doing in this article. The purpose is not to say that those who rely on rights language, especially the supremacy of the right to life, are in the wrong for doing so. Nor is it to say that it can’t be effective. I have seen first-hand how powerful this approach can be in making our case, which is ultimately true. In the end, I want the pro-lifers to win, first and foremost, because I want to protect innocent children. If rights language compels individuals to be on the right side of this issue (pun indeed intended), then use it. Nevertheless, let us proceed with the discussion, beginning with the shortcomings of rights language in pro-life argumentation.

The two primary issues related to the invocation of a “natural rights violation"

First, let us consider the difficulties in defending natural rights. When pro-lifers are asked to defend their conception of natural rights, they find themselves on a few typical paths. Many rely on God’s divine mind to ordain these rights into existence. Some will say that they have been cemented in the foundation of this country. Others would defend natural rights by appealing to what the alternative would be. While not inherently misguided, each point has its shortcomings and unnecessarily complicates the moral discussion.

On God, the question of his existence must be proven to be true, adding another layer to the argument. The likelihood that you will convince your abortion-loving leftist friend of God’s existence is doubtful, especially considering the confines of an abortion-focused discussion. One may side-step the perceived problem of proving God’s existence by showcasing the rich history of believing in God in the United States. Indeed, the conception of an almighty creator, specifically the Christian understanding, is as ubiquitous as any other idea that rightfully finds itself within our history. However, this again adds another layer to the discussion that takes the conversation away from abortion.  Furthermore, I find these points to be important in a comprehensive discussion about the issue but not required in a conversation about the morality of abortion.

Natural rights do find themselves in our American intellectual and legal tradition. But if this is one’s sole grounding for their position, it can be problematic. Many Americans are politically illiterate; your interlocutors may not share this understanding. Thus, lots of groundwork will likely need to be established. Secondly, solely relying on an appeal to our history, while I encourage in union with other considerations to be most prudent, is flawed. just because it has been does not mean it has to be or is automatically moral.

Let us discuss the appeal to a world that does not acknowledge natural rights. In principle, some governments have indeed suffered without inculcating natural rights in their laws. However, it does not follow that the absence of natural rights necessarily would produce this effect. I must note that while the basic building blocks of said natural rights existed before the 17^th century, the Enlightenment thinkers clearly championed their formal articulations, conceiving of the rights frameworks we are more familiar with today. While Christians have long held the sanctity of human life as paramount in society, I consider the right to life a distinct construction, always existing in an individual-focused rights framework. Those who suggest the world would necessarily be worse without natural rights must also hold, for example, that Christian lead communities in antiquity, oriented to the common good, were all worse off, or any society for that matter, that prospered before the period of said enlightenment. But that notion I find to be absurd. To say, “Without natural rights, the world will be worse off,” without properly considering alternatives, is arrogant and flawed. Certainly, for example, a well-orchestrated political approach that did not rely on natural rights but more so on ordering the law toward the common good could potentially be a better framework.

The second major issue that I see is the battle on how a hierarchy of rights is organized. Often, in these discussions, individuals do not disagree much with what rights exist but question how they interface with each other. For example, one may agree that all humans have a “right to life” but that all humans also have a right to bodily autonomy. Much can be said about the scandalous and misunderstood notion of bodily autonomy that I will surely address in the future. Nonetheless, most pro-lifers will accept these common rights and try and prove that the right to life is paramount. That the right to life is the capital of rights, and all other rights must be subordinate to it. But this is a troublesome approach for a few reasons. One, it seems to lack explanatory power to say something like, “Without the right to life, no other rights exist. Thus, your other rights must yield to the right to life of the baby in this situation”. While, in the past, I have partaken in this approach, the established hierarchy is not immediately apparent to the pro-choicer. I find the defense of this to be weak. Second, the abstractness of rights in nature isn’t entirely understandable regarding how they operate or what they mean in these moral dilemmas with respect to our actions. If the argument is that people have both a right to life and a right to liberty, then when a mother is denied an abortion, the pro-lifer may be led to acknowledge that, in some ways, she is being denied her right to liberty. In the natural sense, this seems to suggest that she is being treated unjustly. But there is nothing unjust about being denied abortion. One way to sidestep, which I would suggest if you must be tied to a rights discussion, is to define the right to liberty as the right to “do what you should.” But this just seems to move the argument into a discussion about what is just to do, and if that is what the conversation is about, why not start there? I suspect that it is more likely that a pro-choicer will find it intuitive to consider whether abortion is justified before they are willing to accept that definition of liberty, which strays so far from the modern liberal conception of freedom, making it likely almost impossible for a liberal to understand. Thus, we have arrived at what is truly at the core of this issue, the unjust treatment of a child.  

Focus Purely on Justice

Let us first define what Justice is. Justice is the virtue of rendering to one what they are owed. This definition is rooted firmly in our world and intuitive for most. When I am treated justly, I am being given the respect I am due. When I treat others justly, I give them what they deserve. While all concepts are abstract, this one suffers less from being disconnected from reality as the idea of an intricate hierarchy of supposed natural rights often does. For example, I suspect people will likely question what it necessarily means to actualize their daily right to life or be in accord with their right to liberty. But I would find it hard to believe the same person would be disconnected from what it would mean to treat someone just throughout their day, without any rights considerations. Or, for that matter, how it feels to experience just treatment themselves. People naturally will feel more in tune with what it means to be a virtuous and just person than someone who appropriately made use of their rights. Justice being more universal to our minds than natural rights should not be taken trivially; an approach more accessible to the intellect lends itself to having greater explanatory power for someone. In the same way, you will understand your native language better than a foreign language, so we should tune our argument to align with how people think about issues.

In my approach, I focus simply on the question of whether the action that a woman takes when she aborts her child is justified. Individuals, I would argue, particularly mothers, know how to treat children properly. When the focus is on what is the just treatment of a child, abortion never fits that criterion. There is no need to evoke God, no need to get lost in complex rights discussions, and no need to rely on the American Constitution.

The biggest burden of this argument lies in the idea of what a child is. Of course, biologically, the organism is a child in relation to its biological mother. The more seasoned pro-choicer will take issue with calling the human organism a child as they will see no person present in the womb until a certain point. This is outside of the scope of this article but has been addressed at length by many individuals and will be thoroughly dealt with by me in the future. Nonetheless, this burden is present within any pro-life argument, with or without rights language. The difference is that the abstract discussion of rights must be fought for and proven, whereas I take justice as almost always understood, agreed upon, and valued between those arguing. In essence, to add the rights discussion in a moral debate is unnecessary and causes more problems than it may solve.

Conclusion

Rights language can muddy the waters on this issue when the focus is really on whether a mother is justified in getting an abortion. Thus, I recommend cutting the rights and appealing to natural justice instead. By knowing that every abortion results in killing a child, it can never reasonably be said that killing the child is a just treatment of the child.

It may be argued that rights discussions already touch on the just treatment of a child. However, rights language is unnecessary in discussing justice. Instead of quibbling over whose rights framework is correct, focus on the dimension that all abortion discussions hinge on: the childhood of the being inside the womb. Once this is demonstrated to be true by the pro-lifer, there is no reason to believe that abortion results in the just treatment of the child. The dimension not addressed in this article, but I plan to discuss in the future, is the legal approach. To give a glimpse of my view on the matter, no one should have the legal protection to kill their own child.

I seek not to eradicate rights language from the discourse on this issue. As I suggested at the onset, when it finds use, let us benefit from its framework. I see this article not as completely transforming pro-life ideas but more so adjusting our focus to be more concentrated on what is essential in hopes of bettering our activism. If the pro-life movement is akin to a captain at sea, then this is more a slight shift in the heading than a ninety-degree turn. Of course, a slight adjustment over a long period can be the difference between finding treasure (let’s say stopping baby murder) and being lost at sea (living fully under pro-choice laws).

I often receive questions from pro-lifers asking me about pro-life argumentation. Here is a question I recently received from a pro-lifer that I will address in this article:

"There is a sleepwalking rapist. This sleepwalker does not have the intention to cause harm. Can the person kill the sleepwalking rapist?"

The Nature of Rape
To understand the action taken, absent the volition on the part of the rapist, we must first understand the nature of rape. "Nature" here refers to how the action is typically organized and realized. I understand rape to be an egregious perversion of the sexual act, caused by non-consensual sex, directed toward the violation of a victim. It is essential, to answer this question fully, that the pro-lifer and pro-choicer come to an agreement on what the act is that is being asked about.

The pro-choicer seems to assume that the rapist being a sleepwalker will cause the pro-lifer serious issues, as the person does not mean to cause harm. While it is true that there is no intention to cause harm, it is also true that harm is caused by virtue of the action itself, not solely by someone intending harm.

Considering the intention behind an action is important, even when the action is directed at you, but some actions are so vile and corrupted that intention is not necessary in determining the response. Furthermore, rape in principle is ordered in an intrinsically evil way toward a victim. By understanding the universal nature of such an action, we can appropriately address any situation in which that action is perpetuated.

The pro-choicer's contrivance may appear complex because of the manipulation of what rape typically entails, voiding a common feature of the act (the intention of the rapist). However, at its core, it is simple: the victim is being violated sexually. The grotesqueness of this violation remains true based on our understanding of the act itself, the nature of rape, and is not negated simply because intention is absent. The evil is still present and being inflicted upon the victim.

Can the Victim Kill the Sleepwalking Rapist?
Rape carries a wrongness that presents an imminent threat to a person. The victim is justified in doing what is necessary to end the attack. If killing the rapist is necessary to stop the assault, then it would be justified, as the intention here is driven by the desire to defend oneself and to disrupt the violation.

The pro-choicer may press on the idea that the rapist is seemingly being punished despite lacking intention. The object of this discussion is based on the pro-choicer's original question about what “can” be done, which is not oriented towards punishing the sleepwalking rapist but rather considering what is morally permissible. In this case, if necessary, killing would be just if the intention is in ending the attack.

If you have any questions you'd like me to consider, please feel free to DM me on any of my socials.

Many times, individuals will take an issue like abortion and conflate every aspect of it, answering each concern with the same argument. Doing this hurts the abortion debate because all these questions have nuance and point to different aspects of the abortion conversation. To act as if they are all the same or to not take each question seriously (even if it may seem trivial) is a disservice to this issue.

In this article, I will be specifically addressing whether it is good for a mother to get an abortion. Other concerns may be touched on but will not be the focus.

Finally, I will exercise restraint on certain concepts. The goal is to make this a comprehensive but brief argument. If I explained and defended each concept in depth, I would fail to maintain brevity.

The Argument
On the question of whether abortion is good for mothers, I can emphatically say no. To arrive at this position, here is the deductive argument:

P1: A mother is a good mother insofar as she promotes the flourishing of her children.
P2: Abortion disrupts the child’s natural directiveness to flourish.
C: Abortion is not good for mothers.

Before going through each part of the argument, I suspect some groundwork is necessary, which will be addressed next.

Laying the Foundation
Firstly, when I speak of good, I speak of it ontologically, meaning how it exists in nature. Something in nature is good insofar as it is perfect. Something is perfect insofar as it aligns with its natural ends.

I suspect many readers will now find themselves in depths they either have yet to experience or hoped never to be in. For those with the intellectual courage to continue, let us expand upon the ideas of goodness being ontological and perfection being in accord with natural ends.

An honest inquiry into the world around us quickly presents the idea that some things can be considered good and others not good. When you speak of something being good, you refer to it being good in the way it does what it is supposed to. For example, your coffee maker is good when it makes you a hot cup of joe. If your coffee maker breaks one morning, causing you a day of agony as you suffer with your caffeine addiction, that coffee maker is lacking in goodness; it is less than perfect in this way. If it were perfectly good, it would do what it was designed to do. In other words, that coffee maker exists to brew coffee, and when it does not achieve that purpose (or final cause), it can be said with certainty that it lacks goodness in this way.

Consider the human heart. The human heart, simply speaking, exists to pump blood through the body. When a heart does this perfectly, we commonly say that it is a good heart. To reject the natural goodness of this heart would be absurd. If a human heart does not do this, or does not do it well, then it would be lacking in goodness because it fails to do what it is organized or designed to do.

There is a key difference between the end of the coffee maker and that of the human heart, found in their inorganic versus organic beings. Ultimately, through the combination of different components and our own intelligence, the end of the coffee maker is artificial. Which is to say, man has created it to work for a certain purpose. However, in the case of a human heart, it cannot be said that man created it to be a certain way. What is true is that the human heart itself is self-directed towards the function of pumping blood through the human body. Ultimately, we have no control over what makes a heart perfect or what it is naturally inclined to do, nor do we control which heart is good and which heart is lacking in goodness. The heart, by virtue of its nature (what a thing does, directed by what it is), exists to perform this crucial function for man.

The brute may quickly, likely with little thought, critique what has been said by arguing, “I could potentially use my heart as a toy, to be thrown around. In that way, the heart would be considered good in the sense it achieves the end I am using it for.” This critique fails in this way:

Just because X is good in respect to natural end Y does not mean that X could not be considered good in respect to some other artificial or natural end, Z.

The brute misunderstands what has been said. I have not said that the heart could not be considered good in other ways; I have simply said that it is certainly considered good in the way it is naturally inclined to operate (to pump blood through our bodies). It may be the case that a heart can be considered good in other ways, but it can never be the case that the heart can be considered perfect, maximal in goodness, if it does not pump blood through the body because that heart is self-directed towards that natural end. Again, a heart that does not pump blood through the body, as we would expect it to by virtue of its nature, would be lacking in goodness in this way.

Breaking Down the Argument
P1: A mother is a good mother insofar as she promotes the flourishing of her children.

Premise one of the argument touches on the idea of what a good mother is. There is much I can say in respect to how our human nature self-directs us to flourish and that, ultimately, this is what all rational creatures desire. However, to keep this argument as brief as possible, I will assume that what is best for the child is to flourish. On this point alone, much more will be said by me in the future.

Motherhood exists only in relation to one who is mothered. A mother will have perfected her motherhood, who she is as a mother, when she perfectly promotes the flourishing of her child. It is important to note that I am not making the argument that a perfect motherly relationship with your children is synonymous with being a perfect woman. Rather, I am speaking directly to what would be required to be considered a perfect mother, and thus, considering what is necessary in measuring the degree of goodness a mother exhibits. While of course perfecting your motherhood will benefit your person in general, it is not the case that just by being the perfect mother for your child means that you are perfect in every way as a person.

P2: Abortion disrupts the child’s natural directiveness to flourish.

On premise two, the child is naturally growing and developing on the path to fulfillment. Abortion directly kills the child, halting growth and development, and thus disrupts flourishing.

By virtue of the child being a unique individual human organism, it acts in this way. Everything that is, exists for an end, and for organic composites, is organized by nature to direct it to that end. Simply, every part in that child’s small body serves a purpose that works to improve the life of the child.

Some may be skeptical about this reality, considering that some people are created with defects or deformities. Aspects of the being of some individuals seemingly work towards self-destruction. While this is possible and does occur, it does not disprove what has been said. Rather, it acknowledges that nature can be ordered in the way explained previously, with every part of a child working for the betterment of the child, or disordered, in a case where a part works against the whole.

Some may say that the existence of disorder itself proves that beings are not naturally organized in a way directed to their own flourishing. This critique fails in two major ways:

First, the discussion of something being disordered implies that something is ordered. Consider this:

If X is disordered for reason Y, then in the absence of Y, X must be ordered properly.

Hence, those who hold this critique seemingly believe in the ordered versus disordered diagnosis of nature.

Second, beings are still naturally moved in a way that is in accord with their natural end to flourish even if they have a level of disorder. For example, a child in the womb with a genetic disposition that harms the organism does not change the fact that the organism still works for its own good, naturally. Disorder does not change the laws that govern nature or how things work, but rather changes circumstances.

Thus, the child is directed towards its flourishing, even if aspects of their being do not work ideally. The mother, by killing the child, abruptly stops the movement toward this state of flourishing.

C: Abortion is not good for a mother.

The conclusion then follows that abortion is not good for a mother. For a perfect mother would not act in this way.

For the brute who doubts this, consider a mother who beats her one-year-old daughter versus one who gives her one-year-old daughter love and affection. Certainly, one situation highlights a good mother, and one clearly shows a mother lacking in goodness. Notice how no consideration was given to the mother’s mental state, nor was there room for subjectivism to corrupt our analysis; it was clear as day which mother exhibited goodness, and which acted contrary to it.

This level of intelligibility is accessible in analyzing the good in abortion. For abortion to be considered good for a mother in any way, the act itself would need to work to perfect a mother. But as shown, the act itself works against what a perfect mother would be.

Conclusions
At this point, it has been said that a mother who aborts her child is not acting in a good way, but the brute still may find little importance in this argument based on not caring for what is good. The brute sees themselves as morally superior, able to define what is good and rank the hierarchy as they see fit, and thus may decide that even a mother lacking in goodness still can and perhaps should act in this way. The brute, likely out of ignorance, does not understand that all people do what they perceive as good. To know what is not good to do and still do it demonstrates a degree of irrationality. This person is actively harming themselves by acting in this way. On this, I shall write much more in the future.

Some at this point may feel disappointed that I did not evoke rights language and engage with the idea that abortion is “not a right.” However, as I mentioned at the beginning of this article, I never set out to demonstrate that abortion is not a right. I would say that what I have said helps build the case that abortion is not a right, something I believe, but I kept to the scope I laid out from the beginning. As for abortion not being a right, I plan to build on this idea and provide argumentation in the near future.

Some will be disappointed to find that I did not engage in an intense pragmatic investigation of the ways abortion is not good for mothers. This was also outside the scope of this article. However, this is an important aspect to consider and will be tackled in the future.

Acknowledgments
I am greatly indebted to the classical philosophers, especially Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Without their work, I could not have prepared the argument in the way I did.